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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Torts-Invasion of Privacy-Right to Retreat
from the Spotlight
In one respect invasion of privacy is a confused theory of tort
liability.1 The confusion occurs when a right of privacy is claimed
by a person who has, at some time in the past, achieved fame or
notoriety through some act or because of some unfortunate circum-
stance, but is no longer in the public spotlight. This results from the
difficulty in balancing an individual's "right to be let alone,"' or to
reform, with that of the public's interest in an unimpeded access to
newsworthy information.3 A different and simpler aspect of the
theory is raised when there is no public interest in the published ma-
terial, because then there is no public policy protecting the pub-
lisher.4 Conversely, if the material published is of public interest,
there is no right of privacy.5
The most famous treatment of a person's right of privacy when
he has receded from the spotlight is the California case of Melvin v.
Reid.6 Defendant published a movie, "The Red Kimono," based on
'The general theory on which a cause of action for invasion of privacy
is based has been stated as follows: "A person who unreasonably and seri-
ously interferes with another's interest in not having his affairs known to
others or his likeness exhibited to the public ...... will be held liable for such
interference. RESTATEMENT, TORTs, § 867 (1939).
2 CooLnY, ToRTS, 29 (2d ed. 1889).
"[T]he interest of the public press in the free dissemination of the truth
and unimpeded access to news is so broad, so difficult to define and so danger-
ous to circumscribe that courts (are) reluctant to make such factually ac-
curate public disclosures tortious, except where the lack of any meritorious
public interest in the disclosure is very clear. ... " Jenkins v. Dell Pub. Co.,
251 F.2d 447, 450 (3d Cir. 1958), affirming 143 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Pa.
1956).
'Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945).
That question is answered by the following language found in Cohen
v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, -, 211 P.2d 320, 321 (1950): The Rights
of "a person who by his accomplishments, fame or mode of life, or by adopt-
ing a profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in
his doings, affairs, or character, is said to become a public personage, and
thereby relinquishes a part of his right of privacy." Accord, Estill v. Hearst
Pub. Co., 186 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir. 1951); Smith v. National Broadcasting
Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 292 P.2d 600 (1956); Schnabel v. Meredith, 378
Pa. 609, 107 A.2d 860 (1954). However, this is true only so long as such
publications are reported accurately. See Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192
F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951); Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F.
Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Garner v.
Triangle Publications, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Meetze v.
Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
' 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
19641
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
facts taken from the life of the plaintiff as a prostitute. Though the
facts were a matter of public record, the plaintiff objected because
eight years before she had changed her ways and was now married
and leading a respectable life.' Plaintiff recovered, but liability was
predicated upon a provision in the California constitution,8 rather
than recognition of a general right of privacy. However, in the
course of its opinion, the court made reference to the defendant's
"unnecessary and indelicate" 9 use of the plaintiff's name, and Pros-
ser has used this language to formulate a test-"publication of
matters violating the ordinary decencies"l---for recovery based upon
invasion of the right of privacy.
In a recent case," the Delaware court was asked to use the
"unnecessary and indelicate" test in judging facts bearing similarity
to those in Melvin v. Reid. Plaintiff's name was used in accurately
describing the last incident of corporal punishment in Delaware. 2
These facts were a matter of public record; nine years had passed
since the incident occurred; and the plaintiff was leading a normal
life at the time of the publication. He argued that identifying him by
name was "unnecessary" because it added nothing of informational
-value and that his reform made the use of his name "indelicate."
"A lapse of time, by itself, does not reinstate a plaintiff's right of privacy
as to the publication of facts. If those facts can be found in public records
and are still matters of legitimate public concern, the privilege to republish
exists. Estill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 186 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir. 1951); Smith v.
Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d 118 (1948) ; Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d
704, 211 P.2d 320 (1950).
' CALIF. CoNsT. art. I, § 1. "All men... [have] by nature... [the right]
of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."
'Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91, 93 (1931). "The
use of... [plaintiff's] true name in connection with the incidents of her for-
mer life in the plot and advertisements was unnecessary and indelicate, and a
willful and wanton disregard of that charity which should actuate us in our
social intercourse ... " Id. 112 Cal. App. at -, 297 Pac. at 93.
" Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. Rav. 383 (1960). Prosser has divided
the tort of invasion of privacy into four categories, the second of which is
"Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff." Id. at
389.
"Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d 773 (Del. 1963).
" RESTATEMENT, ToRTs, § 867, comment c (1939) states that "a public
official, an actor, an author .... or one who unwillingly comes into the pub-
lic eye because of his own fault... are the objects of legitimate public in-
terest during a period of time after their conduct or misfortune has brought
them to the public attention; until they have reverted to the lawful and unex-
citing life led by the great bulk of the community, they are subject to the
privileges which publishers have to satisfy the curiosity of the public as to
their leaders, heroes, villains, and victims."
[Vol. 42
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Therefore, he argued, his situation was similar in all important
respects to Melvin v. Reid which established that liability should be
imposed for the "publication of matters violating the ordinary
decencies. "13
The Delaware court flatly rejected this argument and said:
Such a rule would in reality subject the public press to a standard
of good taste--a standard too elusive to serve as a workable rule of
law .... There must be something more than the mere publica-
tion of facts of record relating to a matter of public interest. In
the Melvin case, in our opinion, there was the fact of exploitation
of plaintiff's private life for commercial profit in a medium-the
motion picture-almost inevitably entailing a certain amount of
distortion to capture the attention of the public.' 4
Though this statement is a flat rejection of the "unnecessary and
indelicate" interpretation of Melvin, it is also a recognition that lia-
bility was properly imposed in that case, for reasons which were
not present in Barbieri. According to the tourt, these reasons would
be: use of a "medium ... entailing.., distortion to capture the
attention of the public"' 5 and "commercial exploitation" of plaintiff's
name.Isa
Many jurisdictions recognize that the right of privacy is invaded
when the defendant exploits the plaintiff's name or private life for
profit;"s however, such exploitation of a person's private life for
commercial profit has been a factor only where the name 7 or
picture s of a person is used in advertising without his permission.
Therefore, Delaware's application of this concept to a situation not
involving advertising is a departure from the norm.' 9
" In Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Calif. 1939),
the court allowed the plaintiff to recover basing its decision on Melvin v.
Reid. However, it made no mention of the "unnecessary and indelicate use
of a name" for the basis of its decision.
" Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d 773, 776 (Del. 1963).15 Id. at 776-77.
15& Ibid.
', E.g., Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938).17Birmingham Broadcasting Co. v. Bell, 266 Ala. 266, 96 So. 2d 263(1957); Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d
82, 291 P.2d 194 (1955) ; Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d
207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942);1
. Pavesich v. New Efigland Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68(1905); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938);
Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d 911 (1948).
1 However, Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 220 F.2d
481 (3d Cir. 1956) classified the following group of cases as involving
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When an advertisement is the method of publication, it is easy to
see the applicability of the concept of "commercial appropriation" as
the basis for imposing liability because the sole motive of the
defendant is financial gain without regard to the public's acquisition
of information. It is possible to say that the same is true when the
publication is not an advertisement, because no matter what the form
of publication 2 0 the basic wrongful act of the defendant is the com-
mercial appropriation of a person's name or personality without
permission. Even advertisements inform the public; but the small
amount of informational value or benefit contained therein is not
enough to offset the invasion of an individual's right of privacy. It
is certainly conceivable that the same situation might be present
when another form of publication is used.2'
However, it is necessary that there be some standard which
clearly defines the applicability of this concept to other forms of
-publication,22 and the difficulty of defining such a standard has
"strictly commercial exploitation of some aspect of an individual's person-
ality": Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Cal. 1939);
Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952); Melvin v.
Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931); Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla.
198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944); and Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C.
780, 195 S.E. 55 (1938). Id. at 486, n.9.
" That entertainment is a legitimate goal and in most instances privileged
and that publications giving out facts of legitimate public concern are priv-
ileged is not questioned here; however, just as the privilege to publish news
can be abused by fictitious additions to a story or publication of non-news-
worthy items; entertainment mediums can also use a person's name or pic-
ture for a commercial motive. Of course courts will permit limited scrutiny
of the private lives of public figures. See Garner v. Triangle Publications,
Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). But when this is carried to the point
of appropriation should the courts not find this as objectionable as using a
name in advertising?
" In Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944), the defendant
wrote a book about the section of Florida in which the plaintiff lived con-
taining a vivid description of the plaintiff's masculine characteristics and
her constant use of profanity. The court allowed recovery for this use of
the elements of her personality without her consent even though it recog-
nized that the book had legitimate entertainment and informational value.
" Informational value could, of course, vary with the type of book, radio
program, television program, or motion picture, and one could find extremes
in each of these mediums that would range from absolute documentary pres-
entations to utter fantasy. Therefore, each case should be strictly determined
on its facts and not by the category in which it might fall. This segrega-
tion of mediums is meant to be only a rough indication of the amount of
informational value one might expect generally from a particular medium.
In order to provide a working standard, Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal. 2d
273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952) set out the following factors for consideration:
(1) the medium of publication; (2) the extent of the use; (3) the public
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caused some courts to refuse to recognize an individual's right in
this situation at all.2" Still other courts; when faced with flagrant
intrusions on an individual's rights, have imposed liability for such
reasons as "unnecessary and indelicate" use of a person's name24 or
the presence of distortion without more.24a The Delaware court
refused to follow either of these alternatives. Instead it would
examine the published material to see if there was a legitimate public
interest in the specific statements complained of. If it did not find
such an interest, it would then impose liability if it found that the
publisher's intent was other than serving the public's right of access
to newsworthy information. 5 In other words, if the court had found
that use of the plaintiff's name was currently newsworthy, it would
have gone no further. But, finding this interest lacking, it examined
the publisher's intent and found that the intention was to satisfy the
public's interest in the merits of corporal punishment, even though
the use of the name did not accomplish the purpose.
Such a test protects a publisher from liability when he makes a
mistake, and it keeps the emphasis where it belongs-on the public's
right-but it has, to some degree, the same flaw as the "unnecessary
and indelicate" test because it is hard to apply. In this respect the
court thought the medium of publication important, and in many
situations this would be a good test. In Melvin, for instance, the
medium was a motion picture, and motion pictures are generally
published to entertain, not to inform. On the other hand because
certain forms 'of publication may involve mixtures of informational
and entertainment value, this test, like the "unnecessary and indeli-
cate" test will be difficult to apply. However, this is not necessarily
so in every instance as the intent or motive of a publisher producing
distorted fictional dramatizations can readily be distinguished from
that present when a publication performs the service of satisfying the
interest served by the publication; and (4) the seriousness of the interference
with the person's privacy. See also, RESTATEmENT, TORTS, § 867, comment d
(1939), which states, "In determining liability, the knowledge and motives
of the defendant, the sex, station in life, previous habits of the plaintiff with
reference to publicity, and other similar matters are considered."
" Generally courts will not distinguish between news for information and
news for entertainment. Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D.
134, 138-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
"Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
"a Leverton v. Curtis Pub. Co., 192 F.2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951).
"Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d at 776-77.
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more important interest of the public in unimpeded access to news-
worthy information. In the latter there should not be recovery; but
it is objectionable that in the former this public interest is said to
protect a publisher when such an interest is not present at all, simply
because it might have been. It is submitted that upon finding a lack
of legitimate public interest in the specific statements complained of,
a court should base its decision on a further investigation of whether
the defendant's intent was to commercially exploit plaintiff's private
life.
RICHARD BURROWS
Trusts-Deviation from Investment Restrictions
In 1924 James B. Duke established the Duke Endowment when
he transferred to trustees a large amount of securities, the income
of which was to be used for educational, religious and other chari-
table purposes." The trust indenture provided that the trustees could
invest the funds of the trust in either government bonds or Duke
Power Company securities, other investments being prohibited. In
1962 over 80% of the trust was invested in common stock of Duke
Power, and over 95%o of the remaining common stock was invested
in two aluminum companies.2 The trustees brought an action for
modification of the trust instrument to permit them to invest in
stocks and bonds of corporations other than Duke Power. Basing
their opinion on New Jersey law because of the terms of the trust
instrument,' the North Carolina Supreme Court said that a court
'20% of net income is to be set aside until an additional $40,000,000 has
been added to the trust. The remaining income is payable 32% to Duke Uni-
versity, 32% to such nonprofit hospitals in North and South Carolina as the
trustees select, 5% to Davidson College, 5% to Furman University, 4% toJohnson C. Smith University, 10% to nonprofit organizations in North andSouth Carolina selected by the trustees which are engaged in caring for
orphans, 2% for care of needy retired Methodist preachers, or widows and
orphans of deceased Methodist preachers in North Carolina, 6% to be usedin erecting rural Methodist churches in North Carolina, and 4% for main-
tenance and supervision of such churches. Cocke v. Duke Univ., 260 N.C. 1,
5-6, 131 S.E.2d 909, 911 (1963).
2 Stocks in companies other than Duke Power were received from eitherMr. Duke or his estate. In 1962 the number of shares and the values of
aluminum company stocks held by the trust were as follows: 791,040 shares
of Aluminum Ltd., of Canada, valued at $17,402,880; 639,644 shares of Al-
coa common, valued at $35,180,420; 59,300 shares of Alcoa preferred, worth$5,040,500. Id. at 13, 131 S.E.2d at 916.
'The trust by its express language is "executed bya resident of the State
[Vol. 42
